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EXPRESSIVE POWER OF INFINITARY [0, 1]-VALUED LOGICS
CHRISTOPHER J. EAGLE
Abstract. We consider model-theoretic properties related to the expressive
power of three analogues of Lω1,ω for metric structures. We give an example
showing that one of these infinitary logics is strictly more expressive than the
other two, but also show that all three have the same elementary equivalence
relation for complete separable metric structures. We then prove that a con-
tinuous function on a complete separable metric structure is automorphism
invariant if and only if it is definable in the more expressive logic. Several of
our results are related to the existence of Scott sentences for complete separable
metric structures.
1. Introduction
In the last several years there has been considerable interest in the continuous
first-order logic for metric structures introduced by Ben Yaacov and Usvyatsov
in the mid-2000s and published in [BYU10]. This logic is suitable for studying
structures based on metric spaces, including a wide variety of structures encountered
in analysis. Continuous first-order logic is a generalization of first-order logic and
shares many of its desirable model-theoretic properties, including the compactness
theorem. While earlier logics for considering metric structures, such as Henson’s
logic of positive bounded formulas (see [HI03]), were equivalent to continuous first-
order logic, the latter has emerged as the current standard first-order logic for
developing the model theory of metric structures. The reader interested in a detailed
history of the interactions between model theory and analysis can consult [Iov14].
In classical discrete logic there are many examples of logics that extend first-order
logic, yet are still tame enough to allow a useful model theory to be developed; many
of the articles in [BF85] describe such logics. The most fruitful extension of first-
order logic is the infinitary logic Lω1,ω, which extends the formula creation rules
from first-order to also allow countable conjunctions and disjunctions of formulas,
subject only to the restriction that the total number of free variables remains finite.
While the compactness theorem fails for Lω1,ω, it is nevertheless true that many
results from first-order model theory can be translated in some form to Lω1,ω -
see [Kei71] for a thorough development of the model theory of Lω1,ω for discrete
structures.
Many properties considered in analysis have an infinitary character. It is there-
fore natural to look for a logic that extends continuous first-order logic by allowing
infinitary operations. In order to be useful, such a logic should still have desir-
able model-theoretic properties analogous to those of the discrete infinitary logic
Lω1,ω. There have recently been proposals for such a logic by Ben Yaacov and
Iovino [BYI09], Sequeira [Seq13], and the author [Eag14]; we call these logics LCω1,ω,
LCω1,ω(ρ), and Lω1,ω, respectively. The superscript C is intended to emphasize the
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continuity of the first two of these logics, in a sense to be described below. The
goal of Section 2 is to give an overview of some of the model-theoretic properties
of each of these logics, particularly with respect to their expressive powers. Both
Lω1,ω and L
C
ω1,ω
extend continuous first-order logic by allowing as formulas some
expressions of the form supn φn, where the φn’s are formulas. The main difference
between LCω1,ω and Lω1,ω is that the former requires infinitary formulas to define
uniformly continuous functions on all structures, while the latter does not impose
any continuity requirements. Allowing discontinuous formulas provides a signifi-
cant increase in expressive power, including the ability to express classical negation
(Proposition 2.8), at the cost of a theory which is far less well-behaved with respect
to metric completions (Example 2.7). The logic LCω1,ω(ρ) is obtained by adding an
additional operator ρ to LCω1,ω, where ρ(x, φ) is interpreted as the distance from x
to the zeroset of φ. We show in Theorem 2.6 that ρ can be defined in Lω1,ω.
One of the most notable features of the discrete logic Lω1,ω (in a countable
signature) is that for each countable structure M there is a sentence σ of Lω1,ω
such that a countable structure N satisfies σ if and only if N is isomorphic to M .
Such sentences are known as Scott sentences, having first appeared in a paper of
Scott [Sco65]. In Section 3 we discuss some consequences of the existence of Scott
sentences for complete separable metric structures. The existence of Scott sentences
for complete separable metric structures was proved by Sequeira [Seq13] in LCω1,ω(ρ)
and Ben Yaacov, Nies, and Tsankov [BYNT14] in LCω1,ω. Despite having shown in
Section 2 that the three logics we are considering have different expressive powers,
we use Scott sentences to prove the following in Proposition 3.4:
Theorem. LetM and N be separable complete metric structures in the same count-
able signature. The following are equivalent:
• M ∼= N ,
• M ≡ N in LCω1,ω,
• M ≡ N in LCω1,ω(ρ),
• M ≡ N in Lω1,ω.
Scott’s first use of his isomorphism theorem was to prove a definability result,
namely that a predicate on a countable discrete structure is automorphism invariant
if and only if it is definable by an Lω1,ω formula. The main new result of this note
is a metric version of Scott’s definability theorem (Theorem 4.1):
Theorem. Let M be a separable complete metric structure, and P : Mn → [0, 1]
be a continuous function. The following are equivalent:
• P is invariant under all automorphisms of M ,
• there is an Lω1,ω formula φ(~x) such that for all ~a ∈M
n, P (~a) = φM (~a).
The proof of the above theorem relies heavily on replacing the constant symbols
in an Lω1,ω sentence by variables to form an Lω1,ω formula; Example 3.5 shows
that this technique cannot be used in LCω1,ω or L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ), so our method does not
produce a version of Scott’s definability theorem in LCω1,ω or L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ).
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2. Infinitary logics for metric structures
Our goal is to study infinitary extensions of first-order continuous logic for met-
ric structures. To begin, we briefly recall the definition of metric structures and
the syntax of first-order continuous logic. The reader interested in an extensive
treatment of continuous logic can consult the survey [BYBHU08].
Definition 2.1. A metric structure is a metric space (M,dM ) of diameter at most
1, together with:
• A set (fMi )i∈I of uniformly continuous functions fi :M
ni →M ,
• A set (PMj )j∈J of uniformly continuous predicates Pj :M
mj → [0, 1],
• A set (cMk )k∈K of distinguished elements of M .
We place no restrictions on the sets I, J,K, and frequently abuse notation by using
the same symbol for a metric structure and its underlying metric space.
Metric structures are the semantic objects we will be studying. On the syntactic
side, we have metric signatures. By a modulus of continuity for a uniformly con-
tinuous function f : Mn → M we mean a function δ : Q ∩ (0, 1)→ Q ∩ (0, 1) such
that for all a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn ∈M and all ǫ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1),
sup
1≤i≤n
d(ai, bi) < δ(ǫ) =⇒ d(f(ai), f(bi)) ≤ ǫ.
Similarly, δ is a modulus of continuity for P : Mn → [0, 1] means that for all
a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn ∈M ,
sup
1≤i≤n
d(ai, bi) < δ(ǫ) =⇒ |P (ai)− P (bi)| ≤ ǫ.
Definition 2.2. A metric signature consists of the following information:
• A set (fi)i∈I of function symbols, each with an associated arity and modulus
of uniform continuity,
• A set (Pj)j∈J of predicate symbols, each with an associated arity and mod-
ulus of uniform continuity,
• A set (ck)k∈K of constant symbols.
When no ambiguity can arise, we say “signature” instead of “metric signature”.
When S is a metric signature and M is a metric structure, we say that M is an
S-structure if the distinguished functions, predicates, and constants of M match
the requirements imposed by S. Given a signature S, the terms of S are defined
recursively, exactly as in the discrete case.
Definition 2.3. Let S be a metric signature. The S-formulas of continuous first-
order logic are defined recursively as follows.
(1) If t1 and t2 are terms, then d(t1, t2) is a formula.
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(2) If t1, . . . , tn are S-terms, and P is an n-ary predicate symbol, then P (t1, . . . , tn)
is a formula.
(3) If φ1, . . . , φn are formulas, and f : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1] is continuous, then
f(φ1, . . . , φn) is a formula. We think of each such f as a connective.
(4) If φ is a formula and x is a variable, then infx φ and supx φ are formulas.
We think of supx and infx as quantifiers.
Given a metric structure M , a formula φ(~x) of the appropriate signature, and a
tuple ~a ∈ M , we define the value of φ in M at ~a, denoted φM (~a), in the obvious
recursive manner. We write M |= φ(~a) to mean φM (~a) = 0. The basic notions of
model theory are then defined in the expected way by analogy to discrete first-order
logic.
The only difference between our definitions and those of [BYBHU08] is that
in [BYBHU08] it is assumed that the underlying metric space of each structure
is complete. We do not want to make the restriction to complete metric spaces
in general, so our definition of structures allows arbitrary metric spaces, and we
speak of complete metric structures when we want to insist on completeness of the
underlying metric. In first-order continuous logic there is little lost by considering
only complete metric structures, since every structure is an elementary substructure
of its metric completion. This is also true in LCω1,ω and L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ), but not in Lω1,ω,
as Example 2.7 below illustrates.
In continuous logic the connectives max and min play the roles of ∧ and ∨,
respectively, in the sense that for a metric structureM , formulas φ(~x) and ψ(~x), and
a tuple ~a, we have M |= max{φ(~a), ψ(~a)} if and only if M |= φ(~a) and M |= ψ(~a),
and similarly for min and disjunction. Consequently, the most direct adaptation
of Lω1,ω to metric structures is to allow the formation of formulas supn φn and
infn φn, at least provided that the total number of free variables remains finite (the
restriction on the number of free variables is usually assumed even in the discrete
case). However, one of the important features of continuous logic is that it is a
continuous logic, in the sense that each formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) defines a continuous
function φM : Mn → [0, 1] on each structure M . The pointwise supremum or
infimum of a sequence of continuous functions is not generally continuous.
A second issue arises from the fact that one expects the metric version of Lω1,ω to
have the same relationship to separable metric structures as Lω1,ω has to countable
discrete structures. Separable metric structures are generally not countable, so some
care is needed in arguments whose discrete version involves taking a conjunction
indexed by elements of a fixed structure. For instance, one standard proof of Scott’s
isomorphism theorem is of this kind (see [Kei71, Theorem 1]). Closely related to
the question of whether or not indexing over a dense subset is sufficient is the issue
of whether the zeroset of a formula is definable.
With the above issues in mind, we present some of the infinitary logics for metric
structures that have appeared in the literature. The first and third of the following
logics were both called “Lω1,ω” in the papers where they were introduced, and the
second was called “Lω1,ω(ρ)”; we add a superscript “C” to the first and second
logics to emphasize that they are continuous logics.
Definition 2.4. The three infinitary logics for metric structures we will be consid-
ering are:
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• LCω1,ω (Ben Yaacov-Iovino [BYI09]): Allow formulas supn<ω φn and infn<ω φn
as long as the total number of free variables remains finite, and the formulas
φn satisfy a common modulus of uniform continuity.
• LCω1,ω(ρ) (Sequeira [Seq13]): Extend L
C
ω1,ω
by adding an operator ρ(x, φ),
interpreted as the distance from x to the zeroset of φ.
• Lω1,ω (Eagle [Eag14]): Allow formulas supn<ω φn and infn<ω φn as long as
the total number of free variables remains finite, without regard to conti-
nuity.
The logic Lω1,ω was further developed by Grinstead [Gri14], who in particular
provided an axiomatization and proof system.
Other infinitary logics for metric structures which are not extensions of contin-
uous first-order logic have also been studied. In a sequence of papers beginning
with his thesis [Ort97], Ortiz develops a logic based on Henson’s positive bounded
formulas and allows infinitary formulas, but also infinite strings of quantifiers. An
early version of [CL16] had infinitary formulas in a logic where the quantifiers sup
and inf were replaced by category quantifiers.
Remark 2.5. We will often write formulas in any of the above logics in forms in-
tended to make their meaning more transparent, but sometimes this can make it
less obvious that the expressions we use are indeed valid formulas. For example, in
the proof of Theorem 2.6 below, we will be given an Lω1,ω formula φ(~x), and we
will define
ρφ(~x) = inf
~y
min
{(
d(~x, ~y) + sup
n∈N
min{nφ(~y), 1}
)
, 1
}
.
The preceding definition can be seen to be a valid formula of Lω1,ω as follows. For
each n ∈ N define un : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by u(z) = min{nz, 1}. Define v : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1]
by v(z, w) = min{z + w, 1}. Then each un is continuous, as is v, and we have
ρφ(~x) = inf
~y
v
(
d(~x, ~y), sup
n∈N
un(φ(~x))
)
.
A similar process may be used throughout the remainder of the paper to see that
expressions we claim are formulas can indeed be expressed in the form of Definitions
2.3 and 2.4.
The remainder of this section explores some of the relationships between LCω1,ω,
LCω1,ω(ρ), and Lω1,ω. It is clear that each L
C
ω1,ω
formula is both an Lω1,ω formula and
an LCω1,ω(ρ) formula. The next result shows that the ρ operation is implemented by
a formula of Lω1,ω, so each L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ) formula is also equivalent to an Lω1,ω formula.
Theorem 2.6. For every Lω1,ω formula φ(~x) there is an Lω1,ω formula ρφ(~x) such
that for every metric structure M and every ~a ∈M ,
ρMφ (~a) = inf{d(~a,
~b) : φM (~b) = 0}.
Proof. Let φ be an Lω1,ω formula, and define
ρφ(~x) = inf
~y
min
{(
d(~x, ~y) + sup
n∈N
min{nφ(~y), 1}
)
, 1
}
.
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(See Remark 2.5 above for how to express this as an official Lω1,ω formula). Now
consider any metric structure M , and any ~y ∈M . We have
sup
n∈N
min{nφM (~y), 1} =
{
0 if φM (~y) = 0,
1 otherwise.
Therefore for any ~a, ~y ∈M ,
min
{(
d(~a, ~y) + sup
n∈N
min{nφ(~y), 1}
)
, 1
}
=
{
d(~a, ~y) if φM (~y) = 0,
1 otherwise.
Since all values are in [0, 1], it follows that:
ρMφ (~a) = inf
(
{d(~a, ~y) : φM (~y) = 0} ∪ {1}
)
= inf{d(~a, ~y) : φM (~y) = 0}.

Each formula of LCω1,ω or L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ) defines a uniformly continuous function on
each structure, and just as in first-order continuous logic, the modulus of continuity
of this function depends only on the signature, not the particular structure. By
contrast, the functions defined by Lω1,ω formulas need not be continuous at all.
The loss of continuity causes complications for the theory, especially when one is
interested in complete metric structures, as is often the case in applications. Of
particular note is the fact that, while every metric structure is an LCω1,ω-elementary
substructure of its metric completion, this is very far from being true for the logic
Lω1,ω:
Example 2.7. Let S be the signature consisting of countably many constant sym-
bols (qn)n<ω. Consider the Lω1,ω formula
φ(x) = inf
n<ω
sup
R∈N
min{1, Rd(x, qn)}.
For any a in a metric structure M we have M |= φ(a) if and only if a = qn for
some n. In particular, if M is a countable metric space which is not complete, and
(qn)n<ω is interpreted as an enumeration of M , then
M |= sup
x
φ(x) and M 6|= sup
x
φ(x).
In particular, M 6≡Lω1,ω M .
While discontinuous formulas introduce complications, they also give a signifi-
cant increase in expressive power. As an example, recall that continuous first-order
logic lacks an exact negation connective, in the sense that there is no connective ¬
such that M |= ¬φ if and only if M 6|= φ. Indeed there is no continuous function
¬ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that ¬(x) = 0 if and only if x 6= 0, so LCω1,ω also lacks an
exact negation connective. Similarly, the formula infn φn is not the exact disjunc-
tion of the formulas φn, and infx is not an exact existential quantifier, and neither
exact disjunction nor exact existential quantification is present in either continu-
ous infinitary logic. In Lω1,ω, we recover all three of these classical operations on
formulas.
Proposition 2.8. The logic Lω1,ω has an exact countable disjunction, an exact
negation, and an exact existential quantifier.
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Proof. We first show that Lω1,ω has an exact infinitary disjunction. Suppose that
(φn(~x))n<ω are formulas of Lω1,ω. Define
ψ(~x) = inf
n<ω
sup
R∈N
min{1, Rφn(~x)}.
Then in any metric structure M , for any tuple ~a, we have
M |= ψ(~a) ⇐⇒ M |= φn(~a) for some n.
Using the exact disjunction we define the exact negation. Given any formula
φ(~x), define
¬φ(~x) =
∨
n<ω
(
φ(~x) ≥
1
n
)
,
where
∨
is the exact disjunction described above. Then for any metric structure
M , and any ~a ∈M ,
M |= ¬φ(~a) ⇐⇒ (∃n < ω)M |= φ(~a) ≥
1
n
⇐⇒ (∃n < ω)φM (~a) ≥
1
n
⇐⇒ φM (~a) 6= 0
⇐⇒ M 6|= φ(~a)
Finally, with exact negation and the fact thatM |= sup~x φ(~x) if and only ifM |=
φ(~a) for every ~a ∈ M , we define ∃~xφ to be ¬ sup~x ¬φ, and have that M |= ∃~xφ(~x)
if and only if there is ~a ∈M such that M |= φ(~a). 
Remark 2.9. Some caution is necessary when using the negation operation defined
in Proposition 2.8. Consider the following properties a negation connective ∼ could
have for all metric structures M , all tuples ~a ∈ M , and all formulas φ(~x). These
properties mimic properties of negation in classical discrete logic:
(1) M |= ∼φ(~a) if and only if M 6|= φ(~a),
(2) M |= ∼∼φ(~a) if and only if M |= φ(~a),
(3) (∼∼φ)M (~a) = φM (~a).
Properties (1) and (3) each implies property (2). In classical {0, 1}-valued logics
there is no distinction between properties (2) and (3), but these properties do not
coincide for [0, 1]-valued logic. Property (2) is strictly weaker than property (1),
since the identity connective ∼σ = σ satisfies (2) but not (1).
The connective ¬ defined in the proof of Proposition 2.8 has properties (1) and
(2), but does not have property (3), because if φ(~a)M > 0, then (¬¬φ)M (~a) = 1.
The approximate negation commonly used in continuous first-order logic, which is
defined by ∼ φ(~x) = 1 − φ(~x), satisfies properties (2) and (3), but not property
(1).
In fact, there is no truth-functional connective in any [0, 1]-valued logic that satis-
fies both (1) and (3). Suppose that∼ were such a connective. Then∼ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
would have the following two properties for all x ∈ [0, 1], as consequences of (1)
and (3), respectively:
• ∼(x) = 0 if and only if x 6= 0,
• ∼(∼(x)) = x.
The first condition implies that ∼ is not injective, and hence cannot satisfy the
second condition.
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The expressive power of Lω1,ω is sufficient to introduce a wide variety of connec-
tives beyond those of continuous first-order logic and the specific ones described in
Proposition 2.8.
Proposition 2.10. Let u : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] be a Borel function, with n < ω, and let
(φl(~x))l<n be Lω1,ω-formulas. There is an Lω1,ω-formula ψ(~x) such that for any
metric structure M and any ~a ∈M ,
ψM (~a) = u(φM1 (~a), . . .).
Proof. Recall that the Baire hierarchy of functions f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is defined
recursively, with f being Baire class 0 if it is continuous, and Baire class α (for an
ordinal α > 0) if it is the pointwise limit of a sequence of functions each from some
Baire class < α. The classical Lebesgue-Hausdorff theorem (see [Sri98, Proposition
3.1.32 and Theorem 3.1.36]) implies that a function f : [0, 1]ω → [0, 1] is Borel if
and only if it is Baire class α for some α < ω1. Our proof will therefore be by
induction on the Baire class α of our connective u : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]. The base case
is α = 0, in which case u is continuous, and hence is a connective of first-order
continuous logic.
Now suppose that u = limk→∞ uk pointwise, with each uk of a Baire class
αk < α. By induction, for each k let ψk(~x) be such that for every metric structure
M and every ~a ∈M ψMk (~a) = uk(φ
M
1 (~a), . . . , φ
M
n (~a)). Then we have
u(φM1 (~a), . . . , φ
M
n (~a)) = lim
k→∞
uk(φ
M
1 (~a), . . . , φ
M
n (~a))
= lim sup
k→∞
ψMk (~a)
= inf
k≥0
sup
m≥k
ψMm (~a)
The final expression shows that the required Lω1,ω formula is infk≥0 supm≥k ψm(~x).

Remark 2.11. The case of Proposition 2.10 for sentences appears, with a different
proof, in [Gri14, Theorem 1.25].
The expressive power of continuous first-order logic is essentially unchanged if
continuous functions of the form u : [0, 1]ω → [0, 1] are allowed as connectives
in addition to the continuous functions on finite powers of [0, 1] (see [BYBHU08,
Proposition 9.3]). If such infinitary continuous connectives are permitted in Lω1,ω,
then the same proof as above also shows that Lω1,ω implements all Borel functions
u : [0, 1]ω → [0, 1].
In order to obtain the benefits of both Lω1,ω and L
C
ω1,ω
or LCω1,ω(ρ), it is some-
times helpful to work in Lω1,ω and then specialize to a more restricted logic when
continuity becomes relevant. A fragment of an infinitary metric logic L is a set
of L-formulas including the formulas of continuous first-order logic, closed under
the connectives and quantifiers of continuous first-order logic, closed under subfor-
mulas, and closed under substituting terms for variables. In [Eag14] we defined a
fragment L of Lω1,ω to be continuous if it has the property that every L-formula
defines a continuous function on all structures. The definition of a continuous frag-
ment ensures that if L is a continuous fragment and M is a metric structure, then
M L M .
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It follows immediately from the definitions that LCω1,ω is a continuous fragment
of both Lω1,ω and L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ). The construction of the ρ operation as a formula of
Lω1,ω in Theorem 2.6 uses discontinuous formulas as subformulas, so L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ) is
not a continuous fragment of Lω1,ω, although it would be if we viewed the formula
ρφ from Theorem 2.6 as having only φ as a subformula. While it is a priori possible
that there are continuous fragments of Lω1,ω that are not subfragments of L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ),
we are not aware of any examples. It also remains unclear whether or not the ρ
operation of LCω1,ω(ρ) can be implemented by an L
C
ω1,ω
formula. We therefore ask:
Question 2.12. Suppose that φ(~x) is an Lω1,ω formula such that for every sub-
formula ψ of φ, ψM : Mn → [0, 1] is uniformly continuous, with the modulus of
uniform continuity not depending on M . Is φ equivalent to an LCω1,ω formula? Is
ρ(~y, φ) equivalent to an LCω1,ω formula?
A positive answer to the first part of Question 2.12 would imply that every
continuous fragment of Lω1,ω is a fragment of L
C
ω1,ω
. In the first part of the question,
the answer is negative if we only ask for φ to define a uniformly continuous function.
For example, consider the sentence σ = supx φ(x) from Example 2.7. For any M
we have σM : M0 → [0, 1] is constant, yet we saw that this σ can be a witness to
M 6≡Lω1,ω M , and hence is not equivalent to any L
C
ω1,ω
sentence. This example can
be easily modified to produce examples of Lω1,ω formulas with free variables that
are uniformly continuous but not equivalent to any LCω1,ω sentence (for example,
max{σ, d(y, y)}).
3. Consequences of Scott’s Isomorphism Theorem
The existence of Scott sentences for complete separable metric structures was
first proved by Sequeira [Seq13] in LCω1,ω(ρ). Sequeira’s proof of the existence
of Scott sentences is a back-and-forth argument, generalizing the standard proof
in the discrete setting. An alternative proof of the existence of Scott sentences
in LCω1,ω goes by first proving a metric version of the Lo´pez-Escobar Theorem,
which characterizes the isomorphism-invariant bounded Borel functions on a space
of codes for structures as exactly those functions of the formM 7→ σM for an LCω1,ω-
sentence σ. Using this method Scott sentences in LCω1,ω were found by Coskey and
Lupini [CL16] for structures whose underlying metric space is the Urysohn sphere,
and such that all of the distinguished functions and predicates share a common
modulus of uniform continuity. Shortly thereafter, Ben Yaacov, Nies, and Tsankov
obtained the same result for all complete metric structures.
Theorem 3.1 ([BYNT14, Corollary 2.2]). For each separable complete metric
structure M in a countable signature there is an LCω1,ω sentence σ such that for
every other separable complete metric structure N of the same signature,
σN =
{
0 if M ∼= N
1 otherwise
We note that a positive answer to Question 2.12 would imply that Sequeira’s
proof works in LCω1,ω, and hence would give a more standard back-and-forth proof
of Theorem 3.1.
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Remark 3.2. Even with the increased expressive power of Lω1,ω over L
C
ω1,ω
, we
cannot hope to prove the existence of Scott sentences for arbitrary (i.e., possi-
bly incomplete) separable metric structures, because there are 22
ℵ0
pairwise non-
isometric separable metric spaces ([KN51, Theorem 2.1]), but only 2ℵ0 sentences of
Lω1,ω in the empty signature.
We can easily reformulate Theorem 3.1 to apply to incomplete structures, but
little is gained, as we only get uniqueness at the level of the metric completion.
Corollary 3.3. For each separable metric structure M in a countable signature
there is an LCω1,ω sentence σ such that for every other separable metric structure N
of the same signature,
σN =
{
0 if M ∼= N
1 otherwise
Proof. Let σ be the Scott sentence for M , as in Theorem 3.1. Since σ is in LCω1,ω,
we have
σN = σN =
{
0 if M ∼= N
1 otherwise
.

The following observation should be compared with Example 2.7 and Proposition
2.8, which showed that there are Lω1,ω formulas (and even sentences) that are not
LCω1,ω or L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ) formulas.
Proposition 3.4. For any separable complete metric structures M and N in the
same countable signature, the following are equivalent:
(1) M ∼= N ,
(2) M ≡Lω1,ω N ,
(3) M ≡LCω1,ω(ρ)
N ,
(4) M ≡LCω1,ω
N .
Proof. It is clear that (1) implies (2). By Theorem 2.6 each LCω1,ω(ρ) formula can
be implemented as an Lω1,ω formula, so (2) implies (3). Similarly, each L
C
ω1,ω
formula is an LCω1,ω(ρ) formula, so (3) implies (4). Finally, if M ≡LCω1,ω
N then, in
particular, N satisfies M ’s Scott sentence, and both are complete separable metric
structures, so M ∼= N by Theorem 3.1. 
The formula creation rules for Lω1,ω imply that if φ(~x) is an Lω1,ω-formula in a
signature with a constant symbol c, then the expression obtained by replacing each
instance of c by a new variable y is an Lω1,ω-formula ψ(~x, y). In particular, the usual
identification of formulas with sentences in a language with new constant symbols
can be used in Lω1,ω. By contrast, when this procedure is performed on an L
C
ω1,ω
or
LCω1,ω(ρ) formula, the result is not necessarily again an L
C
ω1,ω
or LCω1,ω(ρ) formula,
because it may not have the appropriate continuity property. Scott’s isomorphism
theorem provides a plentiful supply of examples.
Example 3.5. Let M be a complete separable connected metric structure such
that Aut(M) does not act transitively on M . Pick any a ∈ M , and let Oa be
the Aut(M)-orbit of a. The fact that Aut(M) does not act transitively implies
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Oa 6=M . Let θa(x) be the Lω1,ω formula obtained by replacing a by a new variable
x in the LCω1,ω Scott sentence of (M,a). Then for any b ∈ X ,
θMa (b) =
{
0 if (M,a) ∼= (M, b)
1 otherwise
=
{
0 if b ∈ Oa,
1 otherwise.
Since M is connected and the image of θMa is {0, 1}, the function θ
M
a is not contin-
uous. Therefore θa is not an L
C
ω1,ω
or LCω1,ω(ρ) formula.
The fact that the formula θa in the above example is an Lω1,ω formula will be
relevant in the proof of Theorem 4.1 below.
4. Definability in Lω1,ω
The original use of Scott’s isomorphism theorem in [Sco65] was to prove a defin-
ability theorem. We obtain an analogous definability theorem for the metric logic
Lω1,ω.
Theorem 4.1. Let M be a separable complete metric structure in a countable sig-
nature. For any continuous function P :Mn → [0, 1], the following are equivalent:
(1) There is an Lω1,ω formula φ(~x) such that for all ~a ∈M
n, φM (~a) = P (~a),
(2) P is fixed by all automorphisms of M (in the sense that for all Φ ∈ Aut(M),
P = P ◦ Φ).
Proof. The proof that (1) implies (2) is a routine induction on the complexity of
formulas, so we only prove that (2) implies (1).
Fix a countable dense subset D ⊆M . For each ~a ∈ D, let θ~a(~x) be the formula
obtained by replacing each occurrence of ~a in the Scott sentence of (M,~a) by a tuple
of new variables ~x. The Scott sentence is obtained from Theorem 3.1. Observe that
this formula has the following property, for all ~b ∈Mn:
θM~a (
~b) =
{
0 if there is Φ ∈ Aut(M) with Φ(~b) = ~a
1 otherwise
For each ǫ > 0, define:
σǫ(~x) = inf
~y
max

d(~x, ~y), inf~a∈Dn
P (~a)<ǫ
θ~a(~y)

 .
Each σǫ(~x) is a formula of Lω1,ω(S).
Claim 4.1.1. Consider any ǫ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) and any ~b ∈Mn.
(a) If M |= σǫ(~b), then P (~b) ≤ ǫ.
(b) If P (~b) < ǫ, then M |= σǫ(~b).
Proof. (a) Suppose that M |= σǫ(~b). Fix ǫ
′ > 0, and pick 0 < δ < 1 such that
if d(~b, ~y) < δ, then
∣∣∣P (~b)− P (~y)∣∣∣ < ǫ′. This exists because we assumed
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that P is continuous. Now from the definition of M |= σǫ(~b) we can find
~y ∈Mn such that
max

d(~b, ~y), inf~a∈Dn
P (~a)<ǫ
θ~a(~y)

 < δ.
In particular, we have that d(~b, ~y) < δ, so
∣∣∣P (~b)− P (~y)∣∣∣ < ǫ′. On the other
hand, inf ~a∈Dn
P (~a)<ǫ
θ~a(~y) < δ, and θ~a(~y) ∈ {0, 1} for all ~a ∈ D
n, so in fact
there is ~a ∈ Dn with P (~a) < ǫ and θ~a(~y) = 0. For such an ~a there is an
automorphism of M taking ~y to ~a, and hence by (2) we have that P (~y) < ǫ
as well. Combining what we have,
P (~b) =
∣∣∣P (~b)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣P (~b)− P (~y)∣∣∣+ |P (~y)|
< ǫ′ + ǫ
Taking ǫ′ → 0 we conclude P (~b) ≤ ǫ.
(b) Suppose that P (~b) < ǫ, and again fix ǫ′ > 0. Using the continuity of P ,
find δ sufficiently small so that if d(~b, ~y) < δ then P (~y) < ǫ. The set D is
dense in M , so we can find ~y ∈ Dn such that d(~b, ~y) < min{δ, ǫ′}. Then
P (~y) < ǫ, so choosing ~a = ~y we have
inf
~a∈Dn
P (~a)<ǫ
θ~a(~y) = 0.
Therefore
max

d(~b, ~y), inf~a∈Dn
P (~a)<ǫ
θ~a(~y)

 = d(~b, ~y) < ǫ′,
and so taking ǫ′ → 0 shows that M |= σǫ(~b).
⊣ - Claim 4.1.1
Consider now any ~a ∈ Mn. By (a) of the claim P (~a) is a lower bound for
{ǫ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) :M |= σǫ(~a)}. If α is another lower bound, and α > P (~a), then
there is ǫ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) such that P (~a) < ǫ < α. By (b) of the claim we have
M |= σǫ(~a) for this ǫ, contradicting the choice of α. Therefore
P (~a) = inf {ǫ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) :M |= σǫ(~a)} .
Now for each ǫ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1), define a formula
ψǫ(~x) = max
{
ǫ, sup
m∈N
min {mσǫ(~x), 1}
}
.
Then for any ~a ∈Mn,
ψMǫ (~a) =
{
ǫ if σMǫ (~a) = 0,
1 otherwise.
Let φ(~x) = infǫ∈Q∩(0,1) ψǫ(~x). Then
φM (~a) = inf
{
ǫ : σMǫ (~a) = 0
}
= P (~a).
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
We also have a version where parameters are allowed in the definitions:
Corollary 4.2. Let M be a separable complete metric structure in a countable
signature, and fix a set A ⊆ M . For any continuous function P : Mn → [0, 1], the
following are equivalent:
(1) There is an Lω1,ω formula φ(~x) with parameters from A such that for all
~a ∈Mn,
φM (~a) = P (~a),
(2) P is fixed by all automorphisms of M that fix A pointwise,
(3) P is fixed by all automorphisms of M that fix A pointwise.
Proof. Since M is a separable metric space, there is a countable set D ⊆ A such
that D = A in M . An automorphism of M fixes A pointwise if and only if it
fixes D pointwise if and only if it fixes D = A pointwise, which establishes the
equivalence of (2) and (3). For the equivalence of (1) and (2), apply Theorem
4.1 to the structure obtained from M by adding a new constant symbol for each
element of D. 
Theorem 4.1 does not hold, as stated, with Lω1,ω replaced by L
C
ω1,ω
or LCω1,ω(ρ),
because we assumed only continuity for the function P , while formulas in LCω1,ω
always define uniformly continuous functions. Even if P is assumed to be uni-
formly continuous, some intermediate steps in our proof use the formulas discussed
in Example 3.5, as well as other possibly discontinuous formulas, and hence our
argument does not directly apply to give a version of Scott’s definability theorem
in the other infinitary logics.
Question 4.3. Let M be a separable complete metric structure, and let P : Mn →
[0, 1] be uniformly continuous and automorphism invariant. Is P definable in M by
an LCω1,ω-formula? Is P definable in M by an L
C
ω1,ω
(ρ)-formula?
To conclude, we give one quite simple example of definability in Lω1,ω where
first-order definability fails.
Example 4.4. Recall that a (unital) C*-algebra is a unital Banach algebra with an
involution ∗ satisfying the C*-identity ‖xx∗‖ = ‖x‖
2
. A formalization for treating
C*-algebras as metric structures is presented in [FHS14], where it is also shown that
in an appropriate language the class of C*-algebras is ∀-axiomatizable in continuous
first-order logic. The model theory of C*-algebras has since become an active area
of investigation.
A trace on a C*-algebra A is a bounded linear functional τ : A → C such that
τ(1) = 1, and for all a, b ∈ A, τ(a∗a) ≥ 0 and τ(ab) = τ(ba). An appropriate way to
consider traces as [0, 1]-valued predicates on the metric structure associated to a C*-
algebra is given in [FHS14]. Traces appear as important tools throughout the C*-
algebra literature. In the first-order continuous model theory of C*-algebras, traces
play a key role in showing that certain important C*-algebras can be constructed
as Fra¨ısse´ limits [EFH+16], and traces are also related to the failure of quantifier
elimination for most finite-dimensional C*-algebras [EFKV15]. Several other uses of
traces in the model theory of C*-algebras can be found in [FHL+16]. Of particular
interest is the case where a C*-algebra has a unique trace; such algebras are called
monotracial.
14 CHRISTOPHER J. EAGLE
In general, traces on C*-algebras need not be automorphism invariant. For an
example, consider C(2ω), the C*-algebra of continuous complex-valued functions
on the Cantor space. Pick any z ∈ 2ω, and define τ : C(2ω) → C by τ(f) = f(z).
It is straightforward to verify that τ is a trace. For any other z′ ∈ 2ω there is an
autohomeomorphism φ of 2ω sending z to z′. The map Φ : f 7→ f ◦ φ is then an
automorphism of C(2ω), and we have (τ ◦Φ)(f) = τ(f ◦φ) = (f ◦φ)(z) = f(z′), so
τ ◦ Φ 6= τ .
On the other hand, it is easily seen that if τ is a trace on A and Φ ∈ Aut(A),
then τ ◦ Φ is again a trace on A. Thus for monotracial C*-algebras the unique
trace is automorphism invariant. The following is therefore a direct consequence
of Theorem 4.1:
Corollary 4.5. If A is a separable C*-algebra with a unique trace τ , then τ is
Lω1,ω-definable (without parameters) in A.
It is natural to ask whether Lω1,ω-definability in Corollary 4.5 can be replaced
by definability in a weaker logic. Monotracial C*-algebras satisfying certain addi-
tional properties do have their traces definable in first-order continuous logic (see
[FHL+16]), but the additional assumptions on the C*-algebras are necessary. In
[FHL+16] it is shown that the separable monotracial C*-algebra constructed by
Robert in [Rob15, Theorem 1.4] has the property that the trace is not definable in
first-order continuous logic.
The situation for definability in LCω1,ω is less clear. Any trace on a C*-algebra
is 1-Lipschitz, and so in particular is uniformly continuous. An interesting special
case of Question 4.3 is then whether or not the trace on a monotracial separable
C*-algebra is always LCω1,ω-definable.
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